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IN SEARCH OF "GOOD POSITIVE REASONS"
FOR AN ETHICS OF DIVINE COMMANDS:
A CATALOGUE OF ARGUMENTS
J anine Marie Idziak

Recent proponents of a divine command ethics have chiefly defended the theory by refuting
objections rather than by offering "positive reasons" to support it. We here offer a catalogue of such positive arguments drawn from historical discussions of the theory. We present arguments which focus on various properties of the divine nature and on the unique
status of God, as well as arguments which are analogical in character. Finally, we describe a

particularform of the theory to which these arguments point, and indicate how they counteract a standard criticism of it. Throughout we pick up on previous work of Philip Quinn.

During the last several decades there has been renewed interest on the part of
philosophers and theologians in an ethics of divine commands. Most basically, a
divine command moralist holds that the standard of right and wrong is the commands and prohibitions of God. According to the divine command theory, "an
action of kind of action is right or wrong if and only if and because it is commanded or forbidden by God."l In other words, the theory stipulates that "what
ultimately makes an action right or wrong is its being commanded or forbidden by
God and nothing else." 2 According to a divine command moralist, it is not the
case that God commands a particular action because it is right, or prohibits it
because it is wrong; rather, an action is right (or wrong) because God commands
(or prohibits) it.
The defense of any ethical theory operates on two levels: the refutation of
objections which may be brought against the theory, and the presentation of reasons in support of the position and for preferring it to other ethical systems. Recent
proponents of divine command ethics have, for the most part, chosen the former
strategy of defense. In fact, in the first contemporary monographic study of divine
command ethics, Divine Commands and Moral Requirements, Philip Quinn
explicitly states that he does not try to answer the question whether there are "good
positive reasons for believing that a version of divine command theory is true. "1
The historical literature in general is richer in this regard, offering a variety of
putatively "good positive reasons" for adopting an ethics of divine commands.
Our aim in this paper is to present and call attention to these historical arguments, drawn from discussions of the divine command theory in late medieval
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philosophy and theology, in Refonnation and in Puritan theology, and in British
modem philosophy. Some of the sources on which we will draw have hitherto
gone unnoticed in the recent published literature on the divine command theory.
Although we will not here undertake a critical evaluation of the arguments in
question but simply set them out, our catalogue is meant to be suggestive to
philosophers and theologians interested in the divine command theory and hence
a prolegomenon to further attempts to defend it.
As well as considering particular arguments, we will attempt to discern some
basic strategies for the positive defense of the theory. In sections I and II we
consider arguments which connect an ethics of divine commands with various
properties of the divine nature. In section III we look at a line of argument
centering on the unique status occupied by God. Arguments which are analogical
in nature are examined in section IV. Finally, in section V we consider some
wider implications of these arguments. Specifically, we describe a particular
fonn of divine command theory to which some of these arguments point, and
suggest that the body of historical arguments we have delineated serves to counteract one of the standard criticisms leveled against an ethics of divine commands.
I

The citation of authorities is a familiar element of the medieval style of
argumentation, and discussions of the divine command theory from this period
are no exception. Authoritative statements apparently favoring an ethics of divine
commands were brought forward from the writings of Augustine", Ambrose, 5
Gregory the Great, 6 the Pseudo-Cyprian ,7 , Isidore of Seville, 8 Hugh of St. Victor, 9
and Anselm. \0
Such authoritative statements not infrequently represent mere assertions of a
viewpoint or stance, rather than the presentation of reasons or evidence, properly
speaking, for a position. From the point of view of the task at hand, that is, of
searching for "positive reasons" for an ethics of divine commands, the most
interesting of the authoritative statements comes from Hugh of St. Victor's On
the Sacraments. We quote in its entirety the section of the text from which
various quotations were taken:
The first cause of all things is the will of the Creator which no
antecedent cause moved because it is eternal, nor any subsequent cause
confinns because it is of itself just. For He did not will justly, because
what He willed was to be just, but what He willed was just, because
He Himself willed it. For it is peculiar to Himself and to His will that
that which is His is just; from Him comes the justice that is in His will
by the very fact that justice comes from His will. That which is just is
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just according to His will and certainly would not be just, if it were not
according to His will. When, therefore, it is asked how that is just
which is just, the most fitting answer will be: because it is according
to the will of God, which is just. When, however, it is asked how the
will of God itself is also just, this quite reasonable answer will be given:
because there is no cause of the first cause, whose prerogative it is to
be what it is of itself. But this alone is the cause whence whatever is
has originated, and it itself did not originate, but is eternal. II
This text suggests a connection between the dependency of what is just on the
divine will and God's recognized status as first and uncaused cause. Although
the text is somewhat obscure, it bears the following interpretation. When trying
to determine what is just, we look to what accords with the will of God, for the
divine will is considered to be paradigmatic ally just. Now in seeking the foundation of justice, it does not make sense to seek something else beyond the
divine will. For the divine will is the first cause of all things, and as such, it is
uncaused and has no cause prior to it. Thus, there is no cause of the justness of
the divine will; rather, the divine will itself generates justness.
The text from On the Sacraments takes on additional significance from the
point of view of subsequent discussions of divine command ethics. The connection
suggested by Hugh of St. Victor between an ethics of divine commands and
God's status as first cause and uncaused cause is a connection which recurs in
the historical literature, in somewhat varying forms.
In On Truth, Thomas Aquinas raises the issue of an ethics of divine commands
in asking the question whether justice as found among created things depends
simply upon the divine Will. 12 One of the arguments mentioned by Aquinas in
favor of an affirmative answer to this question, and hence in favor of an ethics
of divine commands, invokes the conception of God as first cause: Justice, as
a certain correctness, depends on the imitation of some rule; the rule of the effect
is its due cause; therefore, since the first cause of all things is the divine will,
it is also the first rule from which everything just is judged. 13 Another of the
arguments reported by Aquinas as supporting the divine command position
involves the uncaused nature of the divine will. Thus he makes mention of the
contention that every will which is just by a principle other than itself is such
that its principle should be sought; however, since Augustine has pointed out
that the cause of God's will is not to be sought, it seems we must conclude that
the principle of justice depends on no other than the divine will. 14
The connection in question is also found in Reformation and early Protestant
theology. Whatever may be the best interpretation of the ethics of Luther and
Calvin overall, there are passages to be found in their writings which are indicative
of an ethics of divine commands. Such statements of a divine command theory
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are at times contextually intertwined with statements about the uncaused nature
of God's wiJI. This juxtaposition is unmistakable in a passage from Martin
Luther's The Bondage of the Will, in which assertions of the uncaused status of
the divine will immediately precede and immediately follow a statement of the
divine command ethical principle:
The same reply should be given to those who ask: Why did God let
Adam fall, and why did He create us all tainted with the same sin,
when He might have kept Adam safe, and might have created us of
other material, or of seed that had first been cleansed? God is He for
Whose will no cause or ground may be laid down as its rule and standard;
for nothing is on a level with it or above it, but it is itself the rule for
all things. If any rule or standard, or cause or ground, existed for it, it
could no longer be the will of God. What God wills is not right because
He ought, or was bound, so to will; on the contrary, what takes place
must be right, because He so wills it. Causes and grounds are laid down
for the will of the creature, but not for the will of the Creator ... 15
This text of Luther was subsequently quoted by Jerome Zanchius in The Doctrine
of Absolute Predestination in his assertion of the position that "the will of God
is so the cause of all things, as to be itself without cause."16 The juxtaposition
of an assertion of the divine command thesis with a description of the divine
will as uncaused is again in evidence in John Calvin's Institutes of the Christian
Religion. At one point in the text, it is after warning "how sinful it is to insist
on knowing the causes of the divine will, since it is itself ... the cause of all
that exists" that Calvin goes on to affirm that "the will of God is the supreme
rule of righteousness, so that everything which he wills must be held to be
righteous by the mere fact of his willing it. "17
The Puritan theologian and divine command moralist, John Preston, explicitly
appeals to God's status as both first cause and uncaused cause in the treatise
Life Eternal!. Preston is noteworthy for his attempt to introduce argumentative
rigor into the line of thought we have been considering, as well as for his way
of construing the relationship between God's causal status and the realm of ethics:
The next Attribute . .. is this: That God is the first without all causes,
having his being and beginning from himselfe.
Now we come to application.
Use I. If the Lord be without all cause, this we may gather then, that
he doth not will any thing, because it is just, or desire it, because it is
good, or love any thing, because it is pleasant; for there is no cause
without him, all perfection is in him originally. The creatures indeed
desire things, because they are good, and love them, because they are
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pleasant; because they seek for perfection out of themselves, because
they are caused by that which is out of themselves: but this is not so
in God, who is the first cause, because, of the first cause there is no
cause; and of the first reason there is no reason to be given .... I
speake this for this end, that in our judging of the waies of God, wee
should take heed of framing a model of our owne, as to thinke, because
such a thing is just, therefore the Lord wils it: ... we forget this, that
every thing is just because he wils it; it is not that God wils it, because
it is good or just. 18

Preston seems to reason in the following way. God is the first cause. God's
status as first cause implies that God is uncaused, that is, that God cannot be
causally affected by anything. If God were to choose something because he
perceived it to possess goodness or justice, then God would be causally affected
by something external to himself, which is impossible. Therefore, it is not the
case that God wills something because it is good or just; rather, something is
good or just because God wills it. In An Exposition of the Symbole or Creed of
the Apostles, the Puritan theologian William Perkins is also found to articulate
an ethics of divine commands within the framework of comments on the uncaused
nature of the divine will similar to those of Preston. 19
II

While the appeal to God's causal powers represents one strain in the defense
of the divine command theory, it is by no means the only aspect of the divine
nature to which this ethical position has been related. One can find yet other
historical arguments which have the form of showing that an ethics of divine
commands is compatible or consistent with some established attribute of God
whereas rejection of this theory is not.
This strategy is employed by John Preston in Life Eternal!, in contending that
an ethics of divine commands is required to preserve God's impeccability. His
argument is straightforward and succinct:
... we should finde out what the will of God is; for that is the rule of
justice and equity; for otherwise it was possible that the Lord could
erre,20 though he did never erre: that which goes by a rule, though it
doth not swarve, yet it may; but if it be the rule itselfe, it is impossible
to erre. 21
Of the same ilk is a line of argument recorded by Ralph Cudworth which
involves the divine omnipotence. In describing the divine command position in
a Treatise Concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality, Cudworth claims that
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"this doctrine hath been since chiefly promoted and advanced by such as think
nothing so essential to the Deity, as uncontrollable power and arbitrary will, and
therefore that God could not be God if there should be any thing evil in its own
nature which he could not do . . . ."22
The argument which Cudworth reports might be unpacked in the following
way. Omnipotence is one of the essential or defining properties of God; or, in
other words, "Necessarily, God is omnipotent." Now let us suppose that an
ethics of divine commands is a false theory and that there is something, x, which
is evil in its own nature entirely apart from a divine prohibition. If this is so,
then God, being good, cannot do x. But then, if God cannot do x, God is not
omnipotent-which is impossible. In other words, the rejection of the divine
command position seems to lead us into the unacceptable position of denying
the divine omnipotence. An ethics of divine commands, on the other hand,
respects God's omnipotence, for if God can make anything right which he wants
to, then there is nothing which he is morally prevented from doing. 23
Cudworth himself is not a proponent, but a vociferous critic of the divine
command position. Thus one can ask the question of how accurately he reports
the actual thinking of divine command moralists.
A number of medievalists have suggested a connection between adherence to
an ethics of divine commands and exaltation of the divine omnipotence in the
case of William Ockham. This explanation for Ockham's favorable disposition
towards the divine command theory has been offered in papers by David Clark,24
Francis Oakley, 25 and Oakley and Elliot Urdang. 26 It has also been suggested by
Frederick Copleston in his history of philosophy. 27 This explanation for the
espousal of an ethics of divine commands may seem intuitively plausible, for
God's postulated institution of morality surely represents an aspect of what God
has the power to do. In the case of Ockham, however, this explanation turns
out to be purely speculative from a strict textual point of view. In reviewing the
texts which serve as evidence for Ockham's adherence to a divine command
theory,28 one can see that they do not contain any deduction of divine command
ethics from the concept of divine omnipotence, nor any explicit argument for
an ethics of divine commands which involves the notion of divine omnipotence.
Further, the connection in question is not suggested by the larger context of
discussion. Ockham's statements of the divine command position do not occur
within questions dealing with the divine power.
Among historical divine command moralists, the best textual evidence we
have found for the postulated connection between an ethics of divine commands and God's omnipotence occurs in the work of Ockham's disciple Gabriel
Biel, specifically, in his commentary on the Sentences, Book I, distinction
forty-three:
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He shows of omnipotence, by what it is directed. He determines how
far it is extended.
And the text can be summarized as follows:
First conclusion: God can do many things which he does not will,
and he can forego many things which he does, and yet his will can be
neither different nor new nor changeable.
Second conclusion: Although what God does or foregoes he justly
does and foregoes, yet if he were to do or forego in a different manner,
he would do or forego these things justly.
Third conclusion: Not things themselves, but the divine will is the
first rule of all justice and rectitude.
First Question
Could God do things which he neither has done nor will do?
For the fourth article we have the conclusion responding to the question: God can do, to some extent or in some way, what he does not do,
and can produce things in a different way than he does. This is clear
because he contingently causes things; therefore he can both cause
something and not bring it about, in one particular way or in another
manner.
Corollary: God can do something which is not just for God to do;
yet if he were to do it, it would be just that this be done. Wherefore
the divine will alone is the first rule of all justice, and because he wills
something to be done, it is just that it be done, and because he wills
something not to be done, it is not just that it be done. 29

In this case, the statement of divine command theory occurs within the framework
of consideration of God's attribute of omnipotence specifically. Biel interprets
the text of Lombard as presenting this theory, and himself endorses it as a
consequence drawn from a particular claim about what God has the power to
do. In section V we will consider further the implications of this connection for
the acceptability of a divine command ethical system.
III

In his treatise On Lm",·s and God the Lawgiver the Renaissance scholastic
Francisco Suarez provides an account of the debate then taking place over an
ethics of divine commands. In a discussion of the position that "certain actions
are so intrinsically bad of their very nature, that their wickedness in no way
depends upon eternal prohibition ... nor upon the divine will" and, con com it-
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antIy, of the position that "other actions are so essentially good and upright that
their possession of these qualities is in no sense dependent upon any external
cause, "30 Suarez gives the following report of the foundation of such a view:
Briefly, the underlying reason for such a view is that moral actions have
their own intrinsic character and immutable essence, which in no way
depend upon any external cause or will, any more than does the essence
of other things which in themselves involve no contradiction, as I at
present assume from the science of metaphysics."
What is significant about Suarez's report is that the rejection of the divine
command position is connected with the metaphysical issue of the status of the
essences, morality being treated as one instance of this more general problem.
This is a strain which recurs in discussions of the divine command theory in
modem philosophy. Ralph Cudworth, George Rust, and Richard Price all
explicitly connect morality, and the rejection of a divine command theory, with
the status of essences and truths as independent of divine decree. 32
On the other hand, it is well known that Descartes maintained the divine
creation of the essences and eternal truths,33 and a connection between such a
position and the espousal of an ethics of divine commands is drawn by Cudworth
in a Treatise Concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality:
But some there are that will still contend, that though it should be
granted that moral good and evil, just and unjust do not depend upon
any created will, yet notwithstanding they must needs depend upon the
arbitrary will of God, because the natures and essences of all things,
and consequently all verities and falsities, depend upon the same. For
if the natures and essences of things should not depend upon the will
of God, it would follow from hence, that something that was not God
was independent upon God.
And this is plainly asserted by that ingenious philosopher Renatus
Descartes . . .34
Important to note is the contention that there cannot be anything which is independent to God. For in A Review of the Principal Questions in Morals, Richard
Price also makes mention of the issue whether "we must give up the unalterable
natures of right and wrong, and make them dependent on the Divine will" in
order to avoid "setting up something distinct from God, which is independent
of him, and equally eternal and necessary."35
The suggested contention that a divine command theory must be adopted in
the realm of ethics because there cannot be anything independent of God may
be seen, we believe, as an attempt to capture the religious insight of the absolute
centrality which God is to enjoy. As such, it bears some analogy to a point made
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in favor of the divine command position by Robert Merrihew Adams, namely,
that such a system satisfies the religious requirement that God be the supreme
focus of one's loyalties.'"
IV

An ethics of divine commands was a major topic of discussion in late medieval
philosophy and theology,17 and E. Pluzanski has hypothesized two reasons for
the attractiveness of this theory to the medieval mentality. On the one hand, he
connects the espousal of an ethics of divine commands with the unwillingness
of medieval theologians to take liberties in interpreting Scripture, which contains
accounts of actions which clearly seem to contradict moral laws and which yet
are presented as accomplished under the direct order of God. 's This postulated
connection is verified by the use made, within the medieval divine command
tradition, of such Scriptural cases as Abraham sacrificing Isaac, the prophet
Hosea committing adultery, the Israelites despoiling (and hence stealing from)
the Egyptians on their way out of Egypt, Samson killing himself, Jacob lying
to his father, and the patriarchs practicing polygamy.39 Secondly, Pluzanski
suggests that the structure of civil society in the Middle Ages, in particular, the
large number of special regulations admitted by customary and canon law, prepared the way for acceptance of the idea of an arbitrary moral law. 40
At first blush, Pluzanski's second suggestion appears to be a sociological and
psychological thesis of a highly speculative character. On closer examination,
one can see in Pluzanski's comment the suggestion that an analogical mode of
reasoning with respect to legislative activity may underlie the position of the
divine command moralist.
From this point of view, it is worth taking note of an argument reported by
Thomas Bradwardine in The Cause of God on the side of the divine command
theory:
This could be confirmed by human ecclesiastical laws, and even by
secular ones. For frequently in ecclesiastical laws the Pope says, "It
pleased us thus, or so," which, from that very fact, is established for
a law and is obligatory. Imperial laws too very often have a similar
foundation, wherefore they also say, "What has pleased the sovereign
has the force of law." But so is God free in establishing laws for
governing his whole state, just as these are for his state. Therefore the
will of God is sufficient for law, and the highest law. 41
This argument works with a comparison between civil and ecclesiastical law and
divine legislative activity. From the realm of civil law , it makes use of a statement
in the code of Justinian, "What has pleased the sovereign has the force of law. "42
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When reporting arguments in favor of the view that justice as found among
created things depends simply upon the divine will, Thomas Aquinas mentions
precisely the same text from the Justinian code as supposed evidence that law
is "nothing but the expression of the will of a sovereign. "43 Thus the argument
reported by Bradwardine can be interpreted as claiming that civil law can be,
and indeed frequently is constituted by the mere will of the ruler. Further,
according to this argument, the same thing holds true in the realm of ecclesiastical
law, since papal legislation is often formulated in the terminology of "It pleased
us thusly." Having established a connection between law and will, the argument
proceeds by way of analogy. Just as the pope is governor of the spiritual realm
and just as a civil ruler governs a political state, so God governs all of creation
as his "state." And hence, just as an ecclesiastical or civil ruler has the power
to make law by sheer choice of will, so it must be the case that the will of God
is enough to create law in those matters appropriate to divine legislative activity.
One can also find medieval arguments for an ethics of divine commands which
draw an analogy between metaphysics and ethics. An analogy between the
metaphysical notion of God as "first being" and the ethical notion of God as
"first good" forms the basis of the argument initially presented in favor of a
divine command theory by Andrew of Neufchateau 44 in his commentary on the
first book of the Sentences, distinction forty-eight, question one:
(I)

(2)
(3)

As the "first being" is related to other beings, so is the "first
good" to other goods.
The "first being" is the contingent and free cause of all other
beings, and that on account of which each being is such a being.
Therefore, the "first good," that is, God, is the contingent and
free cause of all other goods, and that on account of which
each good is such a good. 45

The use of the concept of causality in this argument is noteworthy. In the course
of his discussion of the divine command theory, Andrew employs causal terminology too often for its occurrence to be purely accidental. Andrew speaks
of "the first cause and rule of goodness,"46 of the "first cause and reason of
good, "47 and of the "first cause and rule and measure of rectitude. "4H On several
occasions the causal force in morals is explicitly identified with God. Andrew
states that "the rectitude of human action and reason and of the dictate and law
of nature are reduced to the rectitude of the divine will and proceed from it
causally .... "49 Or again, he describes God as "the effective and the final and
as if the formal and the exemplary and the regulative and the measuring cause
of this [moral] good. "50 The significance of such causal terminology is an issue
which will be taken up in section V.
The same strategy of establishing an analogy between what obtains in
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metaphysics and what obtains in ethics is employed and indeed ingeniously
exploited by Peter of Ailly in taking the familiar medieval cosmological argument
fort he existence of God and constructing an analogue of it supporting an ethics
of divine commands. Ailly's version of the cosmological proof is divided into
three stages: firstly, an argument that it is necessary to reach one first efficient
cause; secondly, establishment of the contention that no created thing can serve
this function; and thirdly, an argument that the first efficient cause is to be
identified with the divine will. The analogous proof of divine command ethics
likewise involves three steps. Through rejection of the possibility of an infinite
regress in obligatory laws, Ailly argues for the necessity of one first obligatory
law; he then contends that no created law enjoys this status for the reason that
no created law has from itself the power of binding; finally, using the divine
attribute of perfection and Augustine's definition of eternal law, he establishes
that the first obligatory law is the divine will. Given the enduring popularity of
the cosmological argument, Ailly's extrapolation of it into the realm of ethics
is sufficiently intriguing to merit quoting the text of the argument in its entirety:
Thus the first conclusion is this: Just as the divine will is the first
efficient cause in the class of efficient cause, so, in the class of obligatory
law, it is the first law or rule. Now the first part of this conclusion is
commonly granted by all philosophers; therefore it is assumed as something evident. But in order to prove the second part, I must first advance
some preliminary propositions.
The first proposition is that, among obligatory laws, one is a law
absolutely first.
Proof: Just as there is not an infinite regress in efficient causes, as the
Philosopher proves in Metaphysics II, 3; so there is not an infinite
regress in obligatory laws. Therefore, just as it is necessary to reach
one first efficient cause, so it is necessary to arrive at one first obligatory
law, because the principle is entirely the same in both cases. Therefore,
etc.
The second proposition is that no created law is absolutely first.
Proof: Just as no created thing has of itself the power of creating, so
no created law has of itself the power of binding; for as the Apostle
states in Romans 13, "There is no power except from God," etc ..
Therefore, just as no created thing is the first efficient cause, so no
created law is the first obligatory law; for just as "first cause" is a sign
that it is God who is involved in the causal activity, so "first law" is
an indication that it is God who is imposing the obligation. Therefore,
etc ..
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The third proposition is that the divine will is the law which is absolutely
first.
Proof:
Evidently by the two preceding propositions.
Just as it is ascribed to the divine will to be the first efficient cause, so it
must be ascribed to the same thing to be the first obligatory law; for just as
the former belongs to perfection, so does the latter. Therefore, etc.
Furthermore, this proposition is demonstrated by Augustine in Against
Faustus 22, where he states that the eternal law is the divine intellect or
will commanding that the natural order be maintained and forbidding that
it be disturbed. Now the eternal law is a law absolutely first; similarly,
nothing is prior to the divine will. Therefore, etc ..
And thus the second part of the conclusion is evident.
This line of argument is presented by Peter of Ailly in his introductory commentary
on the first book of the Sentences. 51
Ailly's contemporaries did not let this argument pass without criticism, and
Ailly defended it against a variety of objections: (1) that there is afirst obligatory
law only in the sense of priority of time of institution,52 and concomitantly, that
a created law could be first in this sense;53 (2) that it is in effect a category
mistake to connect the fact of being an obligatory law with the concept of
perfection;54 (3) that the divine will is not, strictly speaking, the eternal law , but
rather, is the eternal maker of law;55 (4) that the divine will is not absolutely the
first law or rule because negative laws (such as "Do not steal") are not derived
from it;56 and (5) that the status of a law or rule is inappropriately assigned to
the divine faculty of will. 57 It is Ailly's response to this last objection which is
the most interesting philosophically, in articulating a version of the divine command theory based on the concept of the divine simplicity, and hence on the
identity of will and intellect in God. 58
Peter of Ailly also makes mention of the analogy between the divine will as
first efficient cause and as first obligatory law in his treatise Is the Church of
Peter Regulated by Law? 59 A possible precursor of Ailly's argument is to be
found in a line of argument recorded in Thomas Bradwardine's The Cause of
God. Although lacking an explicit analogy with a cosmological form of argument
for God's existence, the argument reported by Bradwardine is like Ailly's argument in contending that there cannot be an infinite regress in the rules of justice,
that the rule which is the highest of all and the origin of the other rules cannot
be in some creature, and that this highest law is the divine will. 60
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Surely, one of the purposes of studying the history of philosophy is to gain
insight into problems we are still grappling with today. In addition to providing
examples of a positive strategy of defense for an ethics of divine commands,
there are yet other respects in which the arguments we have just presented make
a contribution to the current discussion of the divine command theory.
In the contemporary literature the most familiar division among divine command
ethical systems is that between metaethical and normative theories. Philip Quinn
has attempted to distinguish yet other forms which an ethics of divine commands
might assume. In Divine Commands and Moral Requirements he investigates
divine command theories based on logical relations such as strict equivalence:
It is necessary that, for all p, it is required that p if and only if God
commands that p.
N(Vp(Rp=Cp» .

It is necessary that, for all p, it is permitted that p if and only if it is
not the case that God commands that not-po
N(Vp(Pp=-C-p».
It is necessary that, for all p, it is forbidden that p if and only if God
commands that not-po
N(Vp(Fp=C-p».61

In a subsequent paper Quinn sets out "to explore a somewhat different terrain,"62
formulating a causal normative theory:
For every proposition which is such that it is logically possible that God
commands that p and it is logically contingent that p, a sufficient causal
condition that it is obligatory that p is that God commands that p, and
a necessary causal condition that it is obligatory that p is that God
commands that p.
For every proposition which is such that it is logically possible that God
commands that p and it is logically contingent that p, a sufficient causal
condition that it is forbidden that p is that God commands that not-p,
and a necessary causal condition that it is forbidden that p is that God
commands that not-p.
For every proposition which is such that it is logically possible that God
commands that p and it is logicall y contingent that p, a sufficient causal
condition that it is permitted that p is that it is not the case that God
commands that not-p, and a necessary causal condition that it is permitted
that p is that it is not the case that God commands that not _p. 63
According to Quinn, the attempt to construe the relation between divine com-
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mands and moral duty in causal terms is meant to incorporate a view held by at
least some divine command moralist which the logical formulations of the theory
fail to embody. Specifically, it is meant to capture an intuitive picture of God
as an agent bringing about or creating moral obligations and prohibitions by
means of his legislative activity. 64
Our historical study shows that there is more to Quinn's proposed causal
version of divine command theory than he recognized. In making this proposal
he is in fact resurrecting an historically established conceptual framework for
articulating an ethics of divine commands. Andrew of Neufchateau, the paradigmatic divine command moralists of the Middle Ages,65 uses causal terminology
in his statement and discussion of the theory. Further, an appeal to God's status
as first and uncaused cause is a strain running through the discussion and defense
of the theory in medieval philosophical theology, Reformation theology, and
Puritan theology. And the medieval divine command moralist Peter of Ailly saw
in the divine will's status as first efficient cause an analogy for God's status in
the realm of morality.
An ethics of divine commands has not infrequently been perceived as a theory
which reduces ethics to a matter of power. As we have already noted, the
seventeenth century British philosopher Ralph Cudworth asserts that "this doctrine
hath been since chiefly promoted and advanced by such as think nothing so
essential to the Deity, as uncontrollable power and arbitrary will, and therefore
that God could not be God if there should be any thing evil in its own nature
which he could not do . . . ."66 Another historical critic of divine command
ethics, Thomas Chubb, saw proponents of the theory as reduced to adopting the
unpalatable position of Hobbes, that is, of grounding God's authority in his
absolute power. 67 In the contemporary literature, D. Goldstick has claimed that
a theist is in the position of affirming, with respect to any divinely willed code
of behavior, that "its moral rightness follows necessarily from its being willed
by somebody omnipotent. "68 Or again, Philip Quinn has described varieties of
divine command theory which "have it that God's commands are to be obeyed
just because he is supremely powerful. "69
Tying the divine command theory to the divine omnipotence has occasioned
severe criticism of it. As representative of this critique, we quote Anthony Flew:
But a price has to be paid for thus making God's will your standard.
. . . you simultaneously lay yourself wide open to the charge that your
religion is a gigantic exercise in eternity-serving, a worship of Infinite
power as such, a glorification of Omnipotent Will quite regardless of
the content of that will. It takes a very clear head-and a very strong
stomach-to maintain such a position openly, consistently, and without
any attempt to burk its harsh consequences. 70
While it cannot be denied that the divine omnipotence has entered into the articu-
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lation and defense of an ethics of divine commands, study of the historical literature does serve to indicate that the notions of God's omnipotence and of his power
over us have not constituted the only considerations offered in support of the divine
command theory, nor have they dominated the discussion. The theory has also
been related to other divine attributes, such as God's impeccability. It has been
related to the religious insight of the absolute centrality of God, expressed as the
view that there cannot be anything which is independent of God. There have been
attempts to use human legislative activity as a model for the divine. And attempts
have been made to defend divine command ethics through notions taken from the
realm of metaphysics, specifically, by invoking God's status as first and uncaused
cause, by drawing an analogy between "being" and "goodness," and by constructing an ethical analogue of the cosmological argument for God's existence.
Thus someone inclined to adopt an ethics of divine commands need not fear being
automatically committed to a doctrine of "Might makes right."71
Loras College
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